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Cavity analysis on the robustness of random networks against targeted attacks:
influences of degree-degree correlations
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Department of Computational Intelligence and Systems Science,
Tokyo Institute of Technology, Yokohama 2268502, Japan
(Dated: June 14, 2018)
We developed a scheme for evaluating the size of the largest connected subnetwork (giant compo-
nent) in random networks and the percolation threshold when sites (nodes) and/or bonds (edges)
are removed from the networks based on the cavity method of statistical mechanics of disordered
systems. We apply our scheme particularly to random networks of bimodal degree distribution
(two-peak networks), which have been proposed in earlier studies as robust networks against ran-
dom failures of site and/or targeted (random degree-dependent) attacks on sites. Our analysis
indicates that the correlations among degrees affect a network’s robustness against targeted attacks
on sites or bonds non-trivially depending on details of network configurations.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 02.50.-r, 84.70.+p
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, much research has been done on
the regulation of connectivity of networks [1–5]. The In-
ternet, electric power grids, and airline routes are exam-
ples of real-world networks, for which the connectivity
is demanded to resist various failures of nodes and/or
links connecting the nodes. Preventing epidemics from
spreading extensively in human/animal networks is an-
other example of the regulation of network connectivity,
for which, in contrast, reduction in the connection effi-
ciency is required.
Erdo¨s-Re´nyi-type random networks (graphs) [6, 7]
and their derivatives provide research for the above-
mentioned purposes with useful test beds. A basic ran-
dom network is generated by connecting any pairs of sites
(nodes) with a probability of p. The degree, which repre-
sents the number of bonds (edges) by which a site is con-
nected directly to other sites, follows a Poissonian distri-
bution, for which frequencies of large degrees that consid-
erably deviate from the mean are practically negligible,
in the case of the basic random network. However, real-
world data indicate that there exist significantly many
nodes of large degrees in the Internet, which is often
modeled by a scale-free network, where the degree distri-
bution is characterized by a power-law form p(k) ∝ k−α
of an appropriate exponent α.
Besides the degree distribution, there are several ma-
jor feature quantities for characterizing network configu-
rations. A na¨ıve generalization from the notion of the de-
gree distribution may be the degree-degree correlation (or
degree correlation), which represents the tendency of how
likely sites of many bonds are to be connected to other
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sites of many or few bonds. The following two quanti-
ties are also widely used. One is the average path length,
which represents how many sites are at least necessary to
follow a path between two randomly chosen sites. Ran-
domly constructed networks typically have much shorter
average path lengths than those for Cartesian lattices [8].
The other is the so-called clustering coefficient, which
denotes the probability that a randomly chosen pair of
sites, which come from the same particular site, is also
connected. In our daily life, this implicates the tendency
that two randomly chosen friends of a particular person
are friends with each other as well [9, 10].
Several earlier studies characterized the robustness of
network connectivity using feature quantities, which orig-
inated in research on percolation phenomena [11]. Cohen
et al. assessed the percolation threshold with respect
to random removal of constituents on random networks,
which was used for arguing the robustness of scale-free
networks [4]. The method of generating function offers
one of the most powerful techniques for such analyses.
Based on this technique, Newman et al. developed sys-
tematic schemes to compute the size of the largest sub-
network, which is occasionally termed the giant compo-
nent, the percolation threshold, the average path length,
etc. for random networks with arbitrary degree distri-
butions [12]. They clarified that scale-free networks are
highly robust against random removal of sites and, in par-
ticular, scale-free networks of α > 3 do not disintegrate
unless all sites in networks break down. Newman also
explored the effects of the degree correlation in random
networks [13], and Golstev et al. gave detailed consid-
eration on how it affects the percolation threshold [14].
They showed that so-called assortative mixing random
networks exhibit higher robustness than those without
degree correlations [15, 16]. The details are mentioned
in the following sections. Some researchers investigated
not only the robustness against random failures but also
the effects of targeted attacks, the terminology of which
is used for referring to random degree-dependent attacks
throughout this paper, on sites on random networks [17–
219] and designed robust networks against various failures
by optimizing the network configurations [20, 21]. Va-
lente et al. [22] and Paul et al. [23] showed that ran-
dom networks characterized by degree distributions of
two or three peaks are most robust against targeted at-
tacks and/or random failures.
Along this research direction, we mainly explore ro-
bustness of networks against targeted bond attacks. More
precisely, we particularly examine random networks of
bimodal degree distributions (two-peak networks) which
are the most robust against site attacks. For this, we will
develop an analytical scheme based on the cavity method,
which was originally developed in statistical mechanics of
disordered systems [24, 25].
For analyzing properties of large random networks, the
cavity method approximately utilizes a message passing
algorithm that exactly holds in the Bethe lattices under
the assumption that the approximate treatment yields
exact results for the random networks in the infinite sys-
tem limit. Study on the Bethe lattices has a long history
as one of few analytically solvable examples of perco-
lation problems [26], and the equivalence between the
infinitely large random networks and the Bethe lattices
has been shown for many examples of disordered systems
[25]. In this sense, our approach can be considered as an
extension of such existing studies to advanced settings
in which various combinations of failure/attacks in con-
junction with degree-degree correlations are taken into
account.
As shown later, our approach reproduces results identi-
cal to those obtained by the generating function method
[11, 12] in various cases. Although the methodological
relationship has not been fully clarified yet, this implies
that the two schemes are potentially equivalent. How-
ever, the cavity method relies more highly on physical
intuition and, therefore, may be easier to understand the
physical meanings of relevant variables/equations that
come out in the analysis.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section,
we briefly review several notions and known results con-
cerning random networks which were necessary for our
research. In particular, concerning the robustness of the
connectivity, the optimality of the two-peak model, which
we focus on later, is mentioned in some detail. In Sec.
III, we develop a scheme for assessing feature quantities
of percolation based on the cavity method. In Sec. IV,
we discuss the use of our scheme for advanced problems
of the two-peak model, in conjunction with validation by
numerical experiments. The final section is devoted to
the summary.
II. SHORT SUMMARY OF RANDOM
NETWORKS
In this section, we review several notions and known
results concerning random networks. The models that
we focus on are also introduced.
A. Random Networks and Degree Distribution
In general, a random network is composed of a collec-
tion of sites (nodes/points) and bonds (edges/links) that
randomly connect pairs of sites. The number of bonds
connected to a particular site is termed the degree k of
the site.
Degree distribution p(k), which denotes the frequency
of sites that have degree k in a network, is widely used
for characterizing an ensemble of random networks. Con-
versely, it is often required to generate random networks
following a given specific degree distribution p(k). Let us
denote di as the degree of index i(= 1, 2, . . . , N), whereN
is the number of sites in the network. For k = 1, 2, . . . ,
we set di = k for Np(k) indices of i = 1, 2, . . . , N . A
practical scheme for the generation is basically as follows
[27]:
(P) Make a set of indices U to which each index i at-
tends di times. Accordingly, we iterate (C1)–(C3).
(C1) Randomly choose a pair of two different elements
from U . We denote the indices of the two elements
as i and j.
(C2) If i 6= j and the pair of i and j has not been chosen
up to that moment, make a bond between i and j
and remove the two elements from U . Otherwise,
we return them back to U .
(C3) If U becomes empty, finish the iteration. Other-
wise, if it is not possible to make more bonds by
(C1) and (C2), return to (P).
Related to p(k), one sometimes has to deal with the
probability that one terminal of a randomly chosen bond
has a degree k, which is assessed as
rk =
kp(k)∑
l lp(l)
=
kp(k)
〈k〉
(1)
with use of the Bayes formula. Here, 〈k〉 =
∑
l lp(l)
denotes the average of degrees on the random network.
B. Degree-Degree Correlations
In addition to the frequencies, one can also take cor-
relations of the degrees into account for characterizing
properties of random networks by using the joint degree-
degree distribution r(k, l), which denotes a joint proba-
bility that two sites directly connected by a randomly
chosen bond in a given network have degrees k and
l. We focus on homogeneously random networks, where
r(k, l) = r(l, k) holds for arbitrary pairs of k and l.
r(k, l) has more information than p(k) or rk in the
sense that they are generally determined or reduced from
3r(k, l) in such a way that∑
l
r(k, l) =
kp(k)∑
l lp(l)
= rk (2)
holds for ∀k. Moreover, r(k, l) is used for characterizing
the degree correlations in random networks. In general,
one can assess a conditional probability when one termi-
nal site of a randomly chosen bond has degree l, the other
terminal has degree k as
rkl =
r(k, l)
rl
=
〈k〉 r(k, l)
lp(l)
(3)
from r(k, l). Random networks, which satisfy
rlk = rl ∀k, l, (4)
are generally regarded as uncorrelated or referred to as
those of no degree correlations.
Let us consider a situation in which we generate ran-
dom networks following a given degree distribution p(k).
Even if p(k) is specified, one can still control the de-
gree correlations by designing conditional probabilities
rkl. The degree of freedom for such a design is assessed
as
F = k2max −
kmax(kmax − 1)
2
− kmax
=
1
2
(
k2max − kmax
)
, (5)
where kmax is the maximum degree in the network. This
is because k2max positive values are assigned to rkl to sat-
isfy rklrl = rlkrk for ∀k, l and
∑
l rklrl = rk for ∀k,
which yields kmax(kmax − 1)/2 and kmax constraints, re-
spectively.
The network generation scheme mentioned in the pre-
ceding subsection is not expected to produce any de-
gree correlations. Many methods have been proposed
for creating non-trivial correlations in random networks
[13, 28, 29]. The scheme proposed in [13], which we em-
ployed for numerical experiments shown in the later sec-
tions, generates random graphs so as to make the joint
distribution of the remaining degrees j and k of two ter-
minal sites of a randomly chosen bond fit in a desired
value ejk. The procedure of this scheme is summarized
as follows:
(I) For a given degree distribution p(k), generate a ba-
sic graph by the algorithm shown in the preceding
subsection. Accordingly, we iterate (D1)-(D3) suf-
ficiently many times.
(D1) Choose two bonds denoted by pairs the terminal
sites, (v1, w1) and (v2, w2), randomly.
(D2) Evaluate remaining degrees (j1, k1) and (j2, k2) of
the above two sites pairs.
(D3) Replace the bonds with two new site
pairs (v1, v2) and (w1, w2) with probability
min[1, (ej1j2ek1k2)/(ej1k1ej2k2)],
where min(x, y) denotes the smaller value of x and y.
For macroscopically quantifying the degree-degree corre-
lations, a measure
R =
1
σ2q
∑
jk
jk
(
ejk − qjqk
)
,
where
σq =
∑
k
k2qk −
(∑
k
kqk
)2
qk =
(k + 1)p(k + 1)∑
j jp(j)
,
is often used [13]. If R of the above equation is zero,
the random network is entirely random. On the other
hand, positive (negative) R indicates a tendency that the
higher/lower-degree sites are more likely to be attached
to other higher/lower-degree sites, the property of which
is sometimes referred to as assortative (disassortative)
mixing.
C. Connectivity and Robustness
We mainly explore the efficiency of connectivity of net-
works. For this, let us define several notions concerning
connectivity.
We refer to two sites i and j as connected if and only if
one can connect i and j by at least one sequence of bonds
between them. Otherwise, the two sites are considered
as disconnected. Given a network, a subnetwork in which
any pairs of sites are connected is termed a connected
subnetwork. In particular, a connected subnetwork that
contains a majority of sites of the original network is
often referred to as the giant component.
When some sites and/or bonds are removed from
the original network, the size of the giant component
is reduced. Such removal can be regarded as corre-
sponding to accidental/voluntary breakdown of machin-
ery/connections in real-world networks. For theoretically
assessing the robustness of network connectivity against
such problems, we consider the following two sources of
defects, random failure, which is modeled by statistically
independent random removal of sites and/or bonds with
certain probabilities and targeted attack, which is also
dealt with as random removal of sites and/or bonds but
only applied to sites whose degrees are larger than a cer-
tain threshold value.
Let us denote Wi as a probability that a site i does
not belong to, or equivalently, is not connected to a giant
component when the networks are randomly constructed.
The size of the giant component is characterized by
S = N−1
∑
i
(1−Wi). (6)
When the networks are affected by the above defect
sources (failures/attacks), the typical value of S is re-
duced as the defects strengthen. The critical value at
4which S vanishes is termed the percolation threshold, by
which we measure the robustness of network connectivity.
D. Two-Peak Random Networks
Before closing this preparatory section, we mention two
results about network robustness.
Earlier independent studies [22] and [23] reported that
networks characterized by bimodal degree distributions,
which are occasionally referred to as two-peak networks,
are most robust against random failures or attacks to
sites among random network ensembles that are charac-
terized only by the degree distributions [30]. Although
both models are classified into the same category of two-
peak networks, there is a difference between how the
larger degree scales as the network size tends to infin-
ity.
Valente et al. [22] explored conditions of optimal
network configurations under the constraint that net-
work degrees are distributed in a bounded range k ∈
[kmin, kmax] (0 ≤ kmin ≤ kmax) keeping the average de-
gree 〈k〉 a finite constant. They found that the optimal
degree distribution against random failures is of the form
that only p(k1) and p(k2) are finite while all other p(k)’s
vanish, where k1 = kmin and (kmin ≤)k2(≤ kmax) is deter-
mined in such a way that 〈k2〉 is maximized while keeping
〈k〉 constant.
On the other hand, Paul et al. [23] presented another
type of two-peak network, which is robust against both
random failures and targeted attacks. They assume that
smaller-degree sites (k1) are dominant in random net-
works and a very small number of the larger-degree (k2)
sites, which they call “hub-nodes ”, is inserted. Under
the constraint that the number of sites N and the aver-
age degree 〈k〉 are fixed, their finding indicates that the
robustness is maximized when the following conditions
hold [31]:
k1 ≈ 〈k〉,
k2 ≈
√
〈k〉N ,
p(k1) = 1− p(k2),
p(k2) =
({
2〈k〉2(〈k〉 − 1)2
2〈k〉 − 1
}2/3
/〈k〉N
) 3
4
.
The networks become more robust for larger N . Note
that k2 in the above expression indicates the highest pos-
sible degree allowed in a random network with average
〈k〉 and size N when no multiple bonds between identical
pairs of sites are permitted [32].
Hereafter, we refer to the former and latter as
the Valente-Sarkar-Stone (VSS) model and the Paul-
Tanizawa-Havlin-Stanley (PTHS) model, respectively.
III. CAVITY APPROACH TO PERCOLATION
ANALYSIS
In this section, we develop a scheme for analyzing the
robustness of random networks against various proba-
bilistic attacks/failures based on the cavity method of sta-
tistical mechanics of disordered systems [24, 25]. Many
existing studies on disordered systems indicate that the
cavity method leads to the exact results in appropriate
infinite system limits for various problems defined over
random networks that are characterized only by a degree
distribution [25] even when the support of the distribu-
tion is not bounded [33–35]. In addition, recent studies
imply that the coverage of this method can be extended
to cases in which non-trivial degree-degree correlations
exist [36–38]. Therefore, we expect that our analysis
shown below provides the exact results as well, the math-
ematically rigorous proof of which is unfortunately diffi-
cult. Instead, the validity of our scheme is shown by re-
production of known results, which have been obtained
using other schemes in earlier studies, and comparison
with numerical experiments.
A. Tree Approximation and Cavity Fields
Let us develop an analytical scheme for evaluating the
size of the giant component (Eq. (6)) for assessing the
network robustness. To do this, we first focus on a gen-
eral property of randomly constructed networks, which
is that lengths of closed paths between randomly chosen
two sites (cycles) typically increase O(lnN) as the size
of networks N tends to infinity as long as the variance
of the degree distribution is finite [39]. This property
is presumably unchanged in most cases even when the
degree-degree correlations are introduced as such corre-
lations decrease exponentially fast with respect to lengths
of paths except for extreme cases. This naturally leads us
to approximately evaluate Eq. (6) by handling the local
network structure of each site as that of trees, which are
free from cycles.
To explain this, we use the notation ∂i to denote a
set of site indices l that are directly connected to a site
i. We also introduce an indicator cl→i = 0 or 1 in the
i-cavity system that is defined by removing site i from
the original system; cl→i = 0 and 1 indicate that l does
and does not belong to a giant component of the i-cavity
system, respectively. Such variables are generally termed
cavity fields [24, 25]. A general and distinctive feature of
trees is that all sites l ∈ ∂i are completely disconnected
from one another by removal of i. This means that when
i is inserted in the i-cavity system, while keeping the
connection to a site j ∈ ∂i, 〈ij〉, is removed, the indicator
that i does not belong to the giant component is assessed
as
∏
l∈∂i\j cl→i, where X\j denotes removal of j from a
set X . However, i and j are connected (a pair) through
only the bond of 〈ij〉 when the original system is a tree,
this represents nothing but the cavity field of i in the
5j-cavity system (see the left figure of Fig.1). This yields
the equation
ci→j =
∏
l∈∂i\j
cl→i. (7)
By moving entirely over the network, this equation can
determine all the cavity fields cl→i given appropriate ini-
tial and boundary conditions. After determining the cav-
ity fields, the indicator that i does not belong to a giant
component of the original system, oi, can be evaluated
as
oi =
∏
l∈∂i
cl→i (8)
by taking the influences from all neighboring sites into
account (the right figure of Fig.1).
B. Macroscopic Description
The following issue plays a key role for furthering our
analysis. Let us classify sites in a graph by degree k, and
denote uk as the frequency that the binary cavity fields
cl→i of sites i of degree k take the value of 1. Namely, uk
is defined as uk = (
∑
i δ|∂i|,kk)
−1
∑
i
(
δ|∂i|,k
∑
l∈∂i cl→i
)
,
where |∂i| stands for the degree of the site i and δx,y = 1
if x = y and 0, otherwise. As N → ∞, we can expect
that uk typically converges to its average with respect
to generation of graphs. Such property is generally re-
ferred to as self-averaging [24]. In the current problem,
the probability that a site neighboring a site of degree k
has a degreem is denoted as rmk. Under the tree approx-
imation, the influences of the cavity fields from the neigh-
boring sites can be averaged independently with respect
to the graph generation. These mean that the algorithm
of Eq. (8) can be macroscopically described as
uk =
∑
l
(k − 1)!
l1!l2! · · ·
(r1ku1)
l1 (r2ku2)
l2 · · ·
=
(∑
m
rmkum
)k−1
, (9)
where
∑
l
represents
∑
l1
∑
l2
· · · under the restriction of∑
t lt = k − 1.
We assume that effects of random failures and/or tar-
geted attacks can be taken into account by random re-
moval of sites and/or bonds. For this, we denote sm
and bmk as removal probabilities of sites of degree m
and bonds connecting two sites of degree m and k, re-
spectively. Suppose that under such an environment of
random removal, a site i is not connected to the giant
component through the bond 〈li〉 from a neighboring site
l ∈ ∂i\j when i is inserted into the i-cavity system. For
this, at least one of the following three holds:
(1) l is not connected to the giant component.
(2) l is removed.
(3) The bond 〈li〉 is removed.
This indicates that um in the right hand side in Eq. (9)
should be replaced by 1 − (1 − sm)(1 − bmk)(1 − um)
assuming that the degrees of sites j and i are m and k,
respectively. Substituting this into Eq. (9) finally yields
a set of equations for determining the frequencies of the
cavity fields
uk =
(
1−
∑
m
rmk(1 − sm)(1− bmk)(1− um)
)k−1
(10)
in a self-consistent manner.
Let us denote wk as the probability that a site of de-
gree k is not connected to the giant component, which
means thatWi = wk for a site i of degree k. By averaging
(
∑
i δ|∂i|,k)
−1
∑
i δ|∂i|,koi with respect to the graph gen-
eration and random (possibly degree-correlated) removal
of sites/bonds, this is assessed as
wk =
(
1−
∑
m
rmk(1 − sm)(1− bmk)(1− um)
)k
, (11)
after determining uk for ∀k = kmin, . . . , kmax by the
above set of equations. Consequently, the size of the
giant component is evaluated as
S =
∑
k
p(k)(1− sk)(1 − wk). (12)
These expressions constitute the main result of the cur-
rent study.
C. Validation by Reproduction of Known Results
Equations (10) and (11) generally hold for random net-
works characterized by a joint degree-degree distribution
r(m, k). However, since the way of derivation and the ob-
tained expressions are somewhat different from those of
known analyses, it is not clear how our scheme is related
to earlier studies. To clarify the relation, we first repro-
duce known results on the giant components for three
basic examples using our developed scheme.
1. Random Failures on Uncorrelated Random Networks
We first focus on uncorrelated networks, which are
characterized by rmk = rk for ∀m, k. When bmk does
not depend on the degrees of sites (bmk = bm), we can
rewrite Eq. (10) as follows
uk =
[
1−
∑
m
rm(1− sm)(1 − bm)(1− um)
]k−1
= (1− U)k−1 ∀ k (13)
6ckЍi
cmЍi
clЍi ciЍj
i
k
l
m
j
ckЍi
cmЍi
clЍi cjЍi
i
k
l
m
j
FIG. 1. Schematic diagram of computation in cavity method. The squares k, l, m, and j denote sites in the i-cavity system.
The left figure corresponds to Eq. (7). ck→i, cl→i, and cm→i represent the cavity fields passed to i when i is inserted in the
i-cavity system. By keeping the bond between i and j out, they compose the cavity field of i in the j-cavity system, ci→j .
After determining all cavity fields coming into i, oi is assessed, following Eq. (8) (the right figure).
where U =
∑
m rm(1− sm)(1− bm)(1− um). This yields
a self-consistent equation of U as
U =
∑
m
rmfm(1 − (1− U)
m−1), (14)
where fm is a product of fractions of site and bond fail-
ures (1 − sm)(1 − bm). This means that the size of a
giant component S on a random network without degree
correlation can be expressed using U as
S =
(
1− s
)∑
k
p(k)
[
1− (1− U)k
]
, (15)
where p(k) is a degree distribution of the random net-
work. This expression is identical to the one obtained in
earlier studies (for example [11]).
Equation (15) can be used for assessing a percolation
threshold of an uncorrelated random network. For ran-
dom failures of sites and bonds on random networks, fm
does not depend on degrees m of sites; therefore,
f =
U∑
m rm(1 − (1− U)
m−1)
(16)
holds. This expression means that the giant component
disappears when U vanishes. Therefore, we take a limit
U → 0 in the above expression and use l’Hoˆpital’s rule,
which yields the percolation threshold as
fc =
1∑
m rm(m− 1)
=
1
〈k2〉
〈k〉
− 1
. (17)
This also agrees with the one obtained in earlier studies
(for example [12]).
2. Targeted Attacks on Uncorrelated Networks
For the second example, let us assess the size of a giant
component and the percolation threshold of uncorrelated
networks against targeted attacks. For this, we assume
that
bmk =
{
bm, m > m
′,
0, m ≤ m′,
(18)
which implies that the attack is targeted to only larger-
degree sites. Let us denote fa and fr as rates of targeted
attacks and random failures, respectively. When fr = 0
or there is no attacks to sites and/or bonds of degree
m ≤ m′, we have an expression
fa =
U −
∑
m rm{1− (1− U)
m−1}∑
M rM{1− (1 − U)
M−1}
(19)
where
∑
m =
∑m′
kmin
and
∑
M =
∑kmax
m′+1. Taking a limit
of U → 0 yields the percolation threshold as
fac =
1−
∑
m rm(m− 1)∑
M rM (M − 1)
. (20)
There could be cases where random networks still have
giant components if all larger-degree sites are removed
or fa = 0. In such cases, the percolation threshold of
random failures after targeted removals is evaluated as
frc =
1∑
m rm(m− 1)
. (21)
To evaluate the size of the giant component of random
networks of no degree correlations, we rewrite Eq. (15)
to make s in Eq. (15) depend on k as sk, which offers an
expression
S =
∑
k
p(k)
(
1− sk
)(
1− (1− U)k
)
. (22)
73. Degree-Correlated Networks
For the final example for validating our scheme, we
analyze random networks of degree correlations against
random failures. Unfortunately, it is difficult to obtain
analytical expressions of thresholds for degree-correlated
networks in the case of correlated networks. However,
one can still numerically evaluate the threshold by solving
wk =
(
1−
∑
m
rmk(1 − s)(1− b)(1− um)
)k
, (23)
uk =
(
1−
∑
m
rmk(1 − s)(1− b)(1− um)
)k−1
, (24)
S = (1− s)
∑
l
p(l)(1− wk), (25)
which is computationally feasible.
One can use Eqs. (11) and (10) to assess the per-
colation threshold due to bond attacks as follows. Let
f = (1 − s)(1 − b) and yk = 1 − uk. This and Eq. (10)
yield an expression
1− yk =
(
1− f
∑
m
rmkym
)k−1
. (26)
Near the percolation threshold, yk ≪ 1 holds, which
makes it possible to expand the left hand side of the
above equations
yk = f
∑
m
(k − 1)rmkym, (27)
and express them in a matrix form,
y = Afy, (28)
where
Aij = (i − 1)rij .
The percolation threshold is determined by the condition
that Eq. (28) has a nontrivial solution. This is reduced
to the eigenvalue analysis of the matrix A, and, in gen-
eral, the largest eigenvalue corresponds to the percolation
threshold.
To confirm the validity of our analytical scheme, we
compared the size of the giant component predicted us-
ing Eq. (25) with the results of numerical experiments.
The experiments were carried out for the two-peak net-
works of k1 = 4 and k2 = 200, which were designed to
have an average degree of 4.4702. The network size was
set to N = 10000. The configuration was obtained by
optimizing networks based on the procedure proposed
by Valente et al. [22] under restrictions of kmin = 4,
kmax = 200, and 〈k〉 = 4.4702. The identical config-
uration was also yielded using an optimization scheme
proposed by Paul et al. [23] for random failures under
constraints of k1 = 4 and N = 10000. In addition to
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Sizes of giant component assessed us-
ing Eqs. (10) and (11) for two-peak random networks that
suffer from random failures. s is a probability of site removal.
The solid red curve shows the theoretical prediction for the
optimized two-peak random network (k1 = 4, k2 = 200) of
R ≈ 0 (uncorrelated, solid red curve). Those for k1 = 4 and
k2 = 10 of R ≈ −0.1 (short-dashed green curve) and R ≈ 0.2
(long-dashed blue curve) are also shown for comparison. The
markers represent the results of numerical simulations, which
are in good agreement with the theoretical predictions.
the optimized two-peak random network, we also per-
formed experiments for non-optimal two-peak networks
of k1 = 4, k2 = 10, 〈k〉 = 4.4702, and N = 10000 for
comparison.
For two-peak networks, the joint distribution of the
remaining degrees, ejk, is uniquely determined when the
network correlation R is given in conjunction with degree
distribution p(k). Therefore, we controlled R employ-
ing the scheme proposed by [13], which is summarized
in Sec. II B., to the basic graphs constructed by the al-
gorithm shown in Sec. II A. Analytically assessing the
conditional degree distribution rmk for a given set of ejk
is difficult. Therefore, we experimentally assessed rmk
from the resulting networks and applied them to Eqs.
(23) and (24) for evaluating the theoretical prediction of
S. The values of the theoretical prediction numerically
accord with those offered by an earlier study [14] in high
accuracy, although their methodological relation has not
been clarified yet.
Figure 2 shows the size of the giant component ver-
sus random failures of two-peak random networks opti-
mized according to earlier studies and others to compare
with the optimized ones. This indicates that networks
become more robust as the degree correlation R is in-
creased, which has been pointed out by Newman [13].
8IV. ANALYSIS OF ADVANCED SETTINGS:
CORRELATED ATTACKS FOR CORRELATED
TWO-PEAK NETWORKS
In this section, we show the utility of the developed
scheme by application to advanced settings, which, as far
as we know, have never been explored in earlier studies.
More precisely, we consider problems of targeted removal
of sites or bonds in two-peak random networks with de-
gree correlations. A distinctive advantage of our scheme
is the direct applicability to cases of correlated attacks
and/or correlated networks, which was somewhat tech-
nically difficult in earlier studies. We use this advantage
to examine how the degree-degree correlations affect the
network robustness of two-peak random networks, which
have been shown as optimal against both random failures
and targeted attacks in the case with no degree-degree
correlations.
A. Unified Treatment of Degree-Correlated Defects
With regards to advanced settings in our scheme, let us
consider situations in which targeted sites or bonds are
removed in correlated two-peak random networks. We
introduce the notation fmk to denote (1− sk)(1 − bmk).
Using this, Eq. (10) is expressed as
ul =
(
1−
∑
m
rmlfml(1− um)
)l−1
, (29)
which yields
By = y (30)
for the matrix expression (28), where
Bmk = Amkfmk. (31)
The percolation threshold again corresponds to a critical
set of probabilities fmk, which corresponds to a nontriv-
ial solution of the above equation. This indicates that
we can evaluate the percolation threshold by numerically
solving
det[B− E] = 0, (32)
with respect to fmk and adopting one of the solutions.
B. Degree-Correlated Site Attacks
In general, there are multiple solutions that satisfy the
above equations. However, we can still obtain analyt-
ical expressions of the percolation threshold by impos-
ing some restrictions for the two-peak random networks.
As one example, let us consider the cases where larger-
degree sites are attacked preferentially under the con-
straint that the rate of site failures over all sites is fixed
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Percolation thresholds concerning site
attacks sc versus degree correlation R. The solid (red) and
dotted (blue) curves represent the percolation thresholds of
the PTHS and VSS models, respectively. In the inset, the
same data near R = 0 are enlarged. The two curves intersect
at R = 0. The reason why the data for the PTHS model
is limited to a small region of R is that the number of sites
with k2 = 200 degree is so small that it is difficult to broadly
change R.
to a given value s. In such cases, we can generally set
fa = fk1k2 = fk2k2 and fr = fk1k1 = fk2k1 . These pa-
rameters are related with s as
s =
{
(1− fa)p(k2), 0 ≤ s ≤ p(k2),
p(k2) + (1− fr)p(k1), s > p(k2).
(33)
The first case of 0 ≤ s ≤ p(k2) in Eq. (33) implicates
situations where only a portion of larger-degree sites suf-
fers from the attacks, whereas the other portion and all
smaller-degree sites are not damaged. In this case, Eq.
(32) yields the percolation threshold as
sc =
(
1−
A11 − 1
A22(A11 − 1)−A12A21
)
p(k2). (34)
The other case of s > p(k2) corresponds to situations
where a giant component exists despite the fact that all
larger-degree sites are removed, for which Eq. (32) offers
the percolation threshold as
sc = p(k2) +
(
1−
1
A11
)
p(k1). (35)
Figure 3 shows the percolation thresholds assessed for
the VSS and PTHS models, which are reviewed in Sec.
II D. The VSS model has a network configuration with
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Percolation thresholds concerning
bond attacks bc versus degree correlation R. The solid (red)
and dotted (blue) curves represent the percolation thresholds
of the PTHS and VSS models, respectively. The percolation
threshold of the PTHS model decreases as R increases. The
reason why the data for the PTHS model is limited to a small
region of R is identical to that of Fig. 3
k1 = 4, k2 = 5, which is obtained using the optimiza-
tion procedure of Valente et al. [22] concerning tar-
geted attacks on sites under the restriction of kmin = 4,
kmax = 200, and 〈k〉 = 4.4702. On the other hand, the
PTHS model has a network configuration with k1 = 4,
k2 = 200, and 〈k〉 = 4.4702, which is offered with the
optimization method proposed by Paul et al. [23] under
the restrictions of k1 = 4 and N = 10000.
In the two-peak models, Eq. (21) guarantees that the
value of the percolation threshold is identical between
the two models for R = 0. Earlier studies showed that
the percolation thresholds concerning random failures on
sites and bonds increase as R increases for both models,
implying that the assortiveness makes the network more
robust against such failures. Figure 3 indicates that this
is the case for intentional site attacks as well. For all
cases of the VSS model, the percolation threshold sc is
determined by the second case in Eq. (33); namely, the
giant component can be sustained even if all larger-degree
sites are removed. However, for the PTHS model of suffi-
ciently low R(< −0.27), the giant component disappears
only by removing a certain number of larger-degree sites.
When R is lower than zero, two sites of different de-
grees are more likely to be connected. This implies that
larger-degree sites act like glue in forming a network of
smaller-degree sites. Constituents of the network would
be disconnected if the glue were removed. This may be
the reason the giant component disappears by only re-
moving a portion/certain number of larger-degree sites.
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Sizes of giant component versus tar-
geted site attacks. The sizes of the giant component are plot-
ted for the PTHS model with R ≈ 0 (analytical results: solid
red line/numerical simulation: circles) and the VSS model
with R ≈ 0.4 (dashed blue line/squares) and R ≈ −0.8 (dot-
ted green line/diamonds). The network size for the numerical
simulation is N = 10000. The error bars are smaller than the
markers.
Figure 3 also indicates that the affect of R is more sig-
nificant in the VSS model than in the PTHS model. This
might be understood as follows. In the PTHS model,
the number of sites with degree k2, Np(k2), grows as
O(N1/4). It is much smaller than that of bonds, which
are directly linked to the sites, k2Np(k2) ∼ O(N
3/4).
Even if R is tuned, this prevents the sites from seg-
regating from sites with degree k1 and, therefore, the
configuration of the network will not change drastically.
This is in accordance with the profile of the percolation
threshold in Fig. 3, which exhibits a weak dependence
on R. In contrast, the numbers of sites and bonds for
a larger degree k2 are comparable in the VSS model as
Np(k2) ∼ O(N) and k2Np(k2) ∼ O(N) hold. This in-
dicates that the larger-degree sites can form almost in-
dependent networks by themselves, separating from sites
with degree k1 when R is set to a sufficiently large pos-
itive value. On the other hand, if R is set to a negative
value, connections of sites of the two different degrees are
enhanced. These mean that the profile of the network is
highly affected by the regulation of R, which may lead to
a relatively strong dependence of the percolation thresh-
old on R in Fig. 3.
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Sizes of giant components versus tar-
geted bond attacks. The sizes of the giant component are plot-
ted for the PTHS model with R ≈ 0 (analytical results: solid
red line/numerical simulation: circles) and the VSS model
with R ≈ 0.4 (dashed blue line/squares), and R ≈ −0.8 (dot-
ted green line/diamonds). The network size for the numerical
simulation is N = 10000 as well as the simulation in Fig. 5
The error bars are smaller than the markers.
C. Degree-Correlated Bond Attacks
For another example, we consider a situation in which
the attacks are preferentially launched on bonds connect-
ing to larger-degree sites under the constraint that the
rate of failures over all bonds is fixed to b. We set
fa = fk2k2 and fr = fk1k1 = fk2k1 = fk1k2 as we did
in the analysis on site attacks. This yields an expression
b ={
(1− fa)r(k2, k2), 0 ≤ b ≤ r(k2, k2),
r(k2, k2) + (1− fr)(1− r(k2, k2)), b > r(k2, k2).
(36)
The first case of 0 ≤ b ≤ r(k2, k2) in Eq. (36) implies
situations where only a fraction of bonds connecting two
larger-degree sites suffers from attacks, whereas all the
other bonds are not damaged. In this case, Eq. (32)
yields the percolation threshold as
bc =
(
(A11 − 1)(A22 − 1)−A12A21
A22(A11 − 1)
)
r(k2, k2). (37)
The other case of b > r(k2, k2) corresponds to situations
where a giant component exists even when all bonds con-
necting two larger-degree sites are removed, for which Eq.
(32) offers the percolation threshold as
bc = r(k2, k2) + brc [1− r(k2, k2)], (38)
where
brc =
(
2A12A21 +A11 −
√
A211 + 4A12A21
2A12A21
)
. (39)
Figure 4 indicates that the VSS model is not as ro-
bust as the PTHS model. This may be understood as
follows. In bond attacks, bonds connecting two sites of a
larger degree k2 are removed preferentially. In the PTHS
model, the number of the sites of degree k2 is much less
than that in the VSS model. This implies that the bonds
that suffer from these attacks are relevant only to such
a small number of sites in the PTHS model and, there-
fore, the damage on such bonds will not significantly de-
teriorate the total efficiency of the network connectivity
compared to the case of the VSS model. Another dis-
tinctive feature is that the percolation threshold of the
PTHS model decreases as R increases. When R is set
to a negative value, the number of bonds that link two
nodes of different degrees increases. This decreases the
number of bonds linking two larger-degree sites, which
will work as a factor of deterioration of the percolation
threshold. However, at the same time, the increase in the
number of bonds connecting two sites of different degrees
will enhance the network connectivity. The dependence
of the percolation threshold on R implies that this effect
overcomes the deterioration factor in the PTHS model.
D. Numerical Validation
For justifying the results obtained in this section, we
performed numerical simulations for the two types of two-
peak-correlated random networks. The procedures for
generating these random networks are the same as those
mentioned in Sec. III C.
Figures 5 and 6 show the size of the giant component
against targeted attacks on sites and bonds, respectively,
for the PTHS and VSS models of N = 10000. The con-
figurations are identical to those mentioned in Sec. IV
B. One can find that analytical results obtained with our
scheme agree with those from numerical simulations with
high accuracy.
In these figures, changes in R cause little notable differ-
ence as long as the situation is set far from the percolation
threshold. However, the figures also indicate that the gi-
ant component generally decreases as R increases. In
addition, there is a tendency that a network with higher
robustness has a smaller giant component at moderate
number of removals. This indicates that we should pay
attention not only to the percolation threshold but also
to the size of the giant component when we want to con-
struct a robust network.
V. SUMMARY
We have developed a scheme for analyzing random
networks characterized by arbitrary degree distributions
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based on the cavity method of statistical mechanics of
disordered systems. By approximately regarding the lo-
cal structure of a given network as a tree, one can con-
struct an approximation method for assessing the prob-
ability that a site does not belong to the giant com-
ponent, which is the largest connected subnetwork of a
random network. The most distinctive advantage of the
scheme is the wide applicability against various types of
attacks and failures that are intended for sites and/or
bonds, which holds even in the presence of degree correla-
tions. The validity and usability of the scheme have been
shown by comparing it with known results and applying
it to analysis of site/bond attacks in degree-correlated
networks of bimodal degree distributions (two-peak net-
works) in conjunction with numerical justification.
Promising future works include assessment of robust-
ness against bond attacks for more realistic networks.
Generalizing our approach to multi-bond and/or directed
networks may also be of interest.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors thank Toshihiro Tanizawa and Hisanao
Takahashi for useful comments and discussions. This
work was partially supported by Grants-in-Aid for Sci-
entific Research on the Priority Areas “Deepening and
Expansion of Statistical Mechanical Informatics” from
the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and
Technology, Japan and KAKENHI No. 22300003 from
JPSP.
[1] S. H. Strogatz, Nature 410, 268 (2001).
[2] E. Kenah and J. M. Robins, Phys. Rev. E 76, 036113
(2007).
[3] L. Huang, Y.-C. Lai, K. Park, and J.S. Zhang, Phys. Rev.
E 73, 066131 (2006).
[4] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham, and S. Havlin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 4626 (2000).
[5] S. N. Dorogovtsev, J. F. F. Mendes, A. N. Samukhin,
and A. Y. Zyuzin, Phys. Rev. E 78, 056106 (2008).
[6] P. Erdo¨s and A. Re´nyi, Publicationes Mathematicae 6,
290 (1959).
[7] P. Erdo¨s and A. Re´nyi, Magy Tud. Akad. Mat. Kutato’
Int. Ko¨zl. 5, 17 (1960).
[8] S. N. Dorogovtsev, A. V. Goltsev, and J. F. F. Mendes,
Rev. Mod. Phys. 80, 1275 (2008).
[9] D. J. Watts and S. H. Strogatz, Nature 393, 440 (1998).
[10] M. E. J. Newman, C. Moore, and D. J. Watts, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 84, 3201 (2000).
[11] D. S. Callaway, M. E. J. Newman, S. H. Strogatz, and
D. J. Watts, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 5468 (2000).
[12] M. E. J. Newman, S. H. Strogatz, and D. J. Watts, Phys.
Rev. E 64, 026118 (2001).
[13] M. E. J. Newman, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 208701 (2002).
[14] A. V. Goltsev, S. N. Dorogovtsev, and J. F. F. Mendes,
Phys. Rev. E 78, 051105 (2008).
[15] A. Va´zquez and M. Weigt, Phys. Rev. E 67, 027101
(2003).
[16] A. Va´zquez and Y. Moreno, Phys. Rev. E 67, 015101
(2003).
[17] R. Cohen, K. Erez, D. ben-Avraham, and S. Havlin,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3682 (2001).
[18] M. Kurant, P. Thiran, and P. Hagmann, Phys. Rev. E
76, 026103 (2007).
[19] R. V. Sole´, M. Rosas-Casals, B. Corominas-Murtra, and
S. Valverde, Phys. Rev. E 77, 026102 (2008).
[20] T. Tanizawa, G. Paul, R. Cohen, S. Havlin, and H. E.
Stanley, Phys. Rev. E 71, 047101 (2005).
[21] A. A. Moreira, J. S. Andrade, H. J. Herrmann, and J. O.
Indekeu, Phys. Rev. Lett. 102, 018701 (2009).
[22] A. X. C. N. Valente, A. Sarkar, and H. A. Stone, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 92, 118702 (2004).
[23] G. Paul, T. Tanizawa, S. Havlin, and H. E. Stanley, Eur.
Phys. J. B 38, 187 (2004).
[24] M. Me´zard, G. Parisi and M. Virasoro, Spin Glass Theory
and Beyond (World Scientific, Singapore, 1987)
[25] M. Me´zard and G. Parisi, Eur. Phys. J. B 20, 217 (2001).
[26] D. Stauffer and A. Aharony, Introduction to Percolation
Theory, 2nd ed. (Taylor and Francis, London, 1992)
[27] A. Steger and N. C. Wormald, Combinatorics, Probabil-
ity & Computing 8, 377 (1999).
[28] S. Maslov and K. Sneppen, Science 296, 910 (2002).
[29] R. Xulvi-Brunet and I. M. Sokolov, Phys. Rev. E 70,
066102 (2004).
[30] Note that there is a slight difference between the two
studies. Paul et al. [23] emphasized that the most robust
networks are achieved by three-peak distributions when
the networks suffer from both failures and attacks, while
optimal networks against either failures or attacks are
generally characterized by two-peak distributions.
[31] T. Tanizawa, G. Paul, S. Havlin, and H. E. Stanley, Phys.
Rev. E 74, 016125 (2006).
[32] M. Bogun˜a´, R. Pastor-Satorras, and A. Vespignani, Eur.
Phys. J. B 38, 205 (2004).
[33] F. Guerra and F. L. Toninelli, J. Stat. Phys. 115, 531
(2004)
[34] M. Talagrand, Spin Glasses: A Challenge for Mathemati-
cians : Cavity and Mean Field Models (Springer-Verlag,
Berlin, 2003)
[35] C. V. Giuraniuc, J. P. L. Hatchett, J. O. Indekeu,
M. Leone, I. Pe´rez Castillo, B. Van Schaeybroeck and
C. Vanderzande, Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 098701 (2005)
[36] C. J. Pe´rez Vicente and A. C. C. Coolen, J. Phys. A:
Math. Theor. 41 255003 (2008)
[37] C. J. Pe´rez-Vicente and A. C. C. Coolen, J. Phys. A:
Math. Theor. 42 169801 (2009)
[38] A. C. C. Coolen and S. Rabello, J. Phys. Conf. Ser. 197,
012006 (2009)
[39] B. Bolloba´s, Random Graphs (Academic Press, London,
1985) p. 123.
